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Cynthia Herdrich felt a sharp, persistent pain in her abdomen.' She
went to see her doctor, a physician who was a member of her health
maintenance organization, 2 but Dr. Lori Pegram sent her home. Herdrich
returned six days later. This time, the doctor found an inflamed six-by-
eight centimeter mass in her abdomen. Instead of sending Herdrich im-
mediately to an emergency ultrasound, the doctor scheduled the test
eight days later. By the time Herdrich had her ultrasound, her appendix
had ruptured and she was suffering from peritonitis, a potentially fatal
internal infection. She required emergency surgery and a lengthy hospital
stay.
Herdrich sued the health plan operators. She was lucky to have this
option, because many plans now require enrollees to sign waivers giving
up the right to sue in court for any alleged malpractice claims. Such waiv-
ers usually force disputants into binding arbitration, concealing wrong-
doing from the public and limiting the range of grievances that patients
can raise
Herdrich claimed that the doctors avoided recommending costly
emergency treatment because they knew any savings to the plan would
increase the size of their annual bonuses.4 She asserted that these incen-
tives created a conflict of interest, violating the plan's fiduciary duty to
patient members and the federal law governing private employee benefit
plans, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).
Her ERISA claim was dismissed by the trial court, but reinstated by a di-
6vided panel of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. ERISA, however,
1. The account of Herdrich's case is taken from Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 363, 365, 374
(7th Cir. 1998).
2. Herdrich was enrolled in the plan through her husband's employer. See id. at 366 n.3.
3. See Barry Meier, In Fine Print, Customers Lose Ability To Sue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10,
1997, at Al.
4. In Herdrich's case, the plan ended up paying far more for Herdrich's extended hospital
stay than it would have if it had ordered an immediate ultrasound and discovered the infected
appendix, a condition easily and inexpensively treated when caught in time. See Herdrich, 154
F.3d at 374.
5. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994), provides that a "fiduciary shall discharge his du-
ties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries." 29 U.S.C.
§ 1104(a)(1) (1994); see also Herdrich, 154 F.3d at 374 n.8 (quoting this section of ERISA).
6. Although Judge Flaum agreed in his dissent with the trial court's judgment that struc-
tural incentives for cost-cutting did not "suffice to make out a cause of action for breach of fidu-
ciary duty under ERISA," Herdrich, 154 F.3d at 381, the majority disagreed, reinstating her
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severely limited her damages award, allowing recovery only for the cost
of medical treatment.7
The doctor-bonus policy attacked by Herdrich is one of several types
of "gag rules" used by managed health care organizations. 8 Traditionally,
gag rules have been thought of as clauses in a doctor's contract with a
managed care organization that prevent the doctor from revealing alter-
native treatment options to her patients if those treatments are not cov-
ered by the plan. However, gag rules come in many forms, ranging from
such explicit policies to implicit rules that silence doctors by financially
penalizing them for ordering expensive emergency treatment or for re-
ferring patients elsewhere.
Managed care organizations have vastly transformed the patient-
physician relationship in the latter half of this century. The primary goal
of the managed care revolution in American health care delivery and fi-
nancing was "to eliminate unnecessary and inappropriate care and to re-
duce costs"9 associated with the traditional fee-for-service model.'0 Man-
cause of action. See id. at 374. Judge Flaum stated that employers and employees will seek bet-
ter plans if the plans are inefficient or harm patients with bonuses that reward bad doctoring,
and that these independent "market forces" will solve any problems caused by gag rules, year-
end bonuses, or conflicts-of-interest. He argued that "market forces help reduce the risk that
the fiduciary's conflict of interest in making coverage decisions will work to the detriment of the
plan and plan beneficiaries. Id. at 381. The majority of the Seventh Circuit panel dismissed the
"market forces" argument proposed by Judge Flaum. Writing for the majority, Judge Coffey
argued that "[t]he 'market forces' the dissent refers to hardly seem to have produced a positive
result in this case-Herdrich suffered a life-threatening illness (peritonitis), which necessitated a
longer hospital stay and more serious surgery at a greater cost to her and the Plan." Id. at 374.
7. Herdrich was able to proceed to trial on her standard medical negligence claim against
the operators of the plan. She won a $35,000 jury award for compensatory damages. See Her-
drich, 154 F.3d at 367. ERISA limited Herdrich's medical negligence claim to recovery of the
cost of medical treatment and barred collection of damages for lost wages, disability, pain and
suffering, emotional distress, and punitive damages. See Robert Pear, Hands Tied, Judges Rue
Law That Limits H.M.O. Liability, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1998, at Al; Robert Pear, H.M.O.'s
Using Federal Law To Deflect Malpractice Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1996, at A24.
8. "Managed care refers to a variety of methods of financing and organizing the delivery of
comprehensive health care where a primary emphasis is on controlling costs to patients and
third-party payers." Jennifer L. D'Isidori, Stop Gagging Physicians!, 7 HEALTH MATRIx 187,
192 (1997).
9. Deven C. McGraw, Financial Incentives To Limit Services: Should Physicians Be Re-
quired To Disclose to Patients?, 83 GEo. L.J. 1821, 1825 (1995) (quoting KATHRYN LANGNWELL,
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE EFFECTS OF MANAGED CARE ON USE AND COSTS OF
HEALTH SERVICES 22 (1992)). See generally Leonard A. Hagen, Physician Credentialing: Eco-
nomic Criteria Compete with the Hippocratic Oath, 31 GONz. L. REv. 427, 428-29 (1996)
(discussing rising costs of health care in the past two decades). From 1980 to 1992, health care
costs in the United States tripled; by 2000, health care costs are expected to reach $ 1.7 trillion,
nearly 18 percent of the GDP. See Nancy J. Picinic, Note, Physicians, Bound and Gagged: Fed-
eral Attempts To Combat Managed Care's Use of Gag Clauses, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 567,
573 n.34 (1997).
10. Under the fee-for-service model of health care delivery and financing, indemnity insur-
ers reimburse doctors and hospitals for patient care. The fee-for-service model encouraged phy-
sicians and hospitals to overtreat patients because they were compensated for each and every
medical procedure or service performed. This system offered little incentive for cost contain-
ment since the purchasers of health care services (insurers) were not themselves the consumers
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aged care organizations (MCOs)1 rely on cost containment mechanisms
that regulate the type, volume, and manner in which health care is deliv-
ered to patient enrollees. Although the growth of managed care has
helped curtail the rise in health care premiums,2 the new system has
raised a new set of medical and legal concerns, because it encourages the
rationing of care and discourages doctors from ordering necessary treat-
ments. Rationing techniques, including utilization reviews, 3 the payment
of financial incentives to physicians, 4 and gag provisions, all operate to
constrain physician and patient control over health care decisions.
MCO gag provisions harm both doctors and patients. This Article ex-
plores the varying kinds of gag rules and the harms they cause, analyzes
recent state legislation and proposed federal legislation, and suggests a
recommendation for further reform.
The wide variety of forms in which gag provisions appear and are jus-
tified complicates the assessment of their nature and effects. Part I pro-
vides general background information about types of existing gag rules.
Part 1I discusses the ways in which gag provisions affect physicians.
Because most MCO-affiliated doctors have employment-at-will arrange-
ments with their MCOs, they may be dismissed without cause or with
only a minimal showing of cause. Without an affiliate, such doctors may
find their livelihood threatened, given the importance of MCOs to the
medical profession in the United States. However, if a doctor fails to dis-
close certain information, she may violate the Hippocratic Oath or the
(patients). For insightful discussions of the policy decisions influencing the shift from fee-for-
service to managed care models, see generally Michelle M. Kwon, Move over Marcus Welby,
M.D. and Make Way for Managed Care: The Implications of Capitation, Gag Clauses, and Eco-
nomic Credentialing, 28 TaX. TECH. L. REv. 829 (1997).
11. Managed care organizations (MCOs) operate as a variety of business structures, in-
cluding, but not limited to, health maintenance organizations (HMOs), independent practice
associations (IPAs), and preferred provider organizations (PPOs). The most common MCO
structure is the HMO, which offers basic and supplemental health care in exchange for a peri-
odic, prepaid, per-capita premium. HMOs then reimburse health care providers through a nego-
tiated, capitated payment made on behalf of each enrolled person or family unit. In addition,
HMOs shift the risk and cost of health care delivery onto doctors. See D'Isidori, supra note 8, at
192. For a more substantial discussion of the differences among MCO structures, see, for exam-
ple, Kwon, supra note 10, at 835-36.
12. See Kwon, supra note 10, at 831 ("The injection of managed care into the third-party
payment system has helped arrest the rise in health care premiums, from double-digit inflation
in previous years to just a two percent increase in 1995.").
13. Utilization reviews involve an evaluation of a patient's treatment, either before or after
the fact, to determine the "necessity and appropriateness (and sometimes the quality) of medi-
cal care." BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 321-22 (West 1995); see Kwon, supra note
10, at 837; Picinic, supra note 9, at 576 ("Utilization review programs require providers to seek
verification from the MCO for particular medical procedures, such as pre-admission approval of
hospital admission, and prior approval for both referrals to specialists and certain treatments.").
14. MCOs generally provide financial incentives, such as capitated payments and bo-
nus/withhold arrangements, to their providers as a means of holding physicians and other health
care providers accountable for the care the provide. See Kwon, supra note 10, at 836-37; Picinic,
supra note 9, at 576.
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doctrine of informed consent. Part II will also discuss how MCO gag pro-
visions create nondisclosable conflicts of interest by providing physicians
a secret financial incentive that conflicts with the patient's well-being.
Regardless of the type, MCO gag rules place doctors in a double-bind.
Part III addresses the effect of gag rules on patients. It argues that gag
provisions harm patients by preventing them from making informed deci-
sions about medical treatments and that these provisions diminish a pa-
tient's ability to select an MCO that best suits his needs because he has
access to little, if any, information about covered treatments.
Finally, Part IV first analyzes one state's statutory prohibition of gag
rules and then proposed federal legislation. The Article then concludes
with suggestions for legislation aimed at solving the problems caused by
gag rules.
I. TYPES OF GAG RULES
MCOs have typically justified gag clauses on the grounds that they
protect proprietary information' s and that they are necessary to protect
the competitive managed care market.16 MCOs argue such clauses are
necessary to prevent doctors from encouraging patients to switch to an-
other plan that might better compensate the doctor. 7 In effect, however,
gag provisions operate to "prevent physicians from making all required
disclosures to their patients or from referring patients to specialists."'
15. See Picinic, supra note 9, at 582-83 & n.71; Robert Pear, Doctors Say HMO's Limit
What They Can Tell Patients, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1995, at Al.
16. See Kwon, supra note 10, at 845 ("MCOs assert that gag clauses are necessary to pro-
hibit physicians from disparaging the MCOs... and denigrat[ing] the MCO[s] to their pa-
tients.... From the MCO's perspective, gag clauses are necessary to compete effectively in an
industry that is becoming increasingly aggressive."); see also CALIFORNIA SENATE RULES
COMMrITEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1805, at 4 (May 20, 1996), cited in Justin D. Harris,
The Timely Demise of "Gag Orders" in Physicians' Contracts with Managed Care Providers, 28
PAC. L.J. 906, 912 (1997) (describing a "disparagement" clause that prohibits doctors from
making any statements to the patient which might undermine the individual's confidence in the
plan); D'Isidori, supra note 8, at 197-98 (discussing MCO justifications for "confidentiality
clauses" which protect proprietary information from competitors); Pear, supra note 15, at Al
(discussing the concerns of MCOs about terminated physicians who will encourage patients to
switch MCOs by disparaging one MCO in favor of another). In line with these justifications,
some MCOs have defended the confidentiality clauses on the grounds that the provisions
"encourage physicians to take their complaints to management rather than to their patients."
D'Isidori, supra note 8, at 198. Accordingly, patients are left out of economic disputes between
doctors and MCOs. See id. Moreover, advocates of the provisions argue that unsatisfied physi-
cians have the option of seeking redress from regulatory agencies if the MCO's administration
is not receptive. In short, MCOs often defend their position by asserting that the
"confidentiality clauses" "merely provide a structured and insulated framework for grievances."
Id.
17. See Picinic, supra note 9, at 607.
18. Kvon, supra note 10, at 837, 846 (discussing the range of constraints created by gag
provisions on physicians, such as the prohibition against discussing with patients the (i) benefits
of a longer hospital stay beyond the time covered by the MCO, (ii) financial incentives doctors
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A. Express Gag Clauses
1. Discussion of Treatment Options
One type of gag rule explicitly prohibits doctors from discussing cer-
tain treatment options with patients. 9 MCOs seek to enforce these provi-
sions in order to prevent patients from seeking coverage elsewhere from
another insurer. MCOs are also concerned that doctors with ulterior mo-
tives might encourage patients to seek coverage from another insurer by
telling patients that their current insurer would not cover the best treat-
ment options for their problems.? Doctors affiliated with multiple MCOs
might be tempted to offer such information because they hope to switch
patients to health plans that provide more lucrative arrangements for the
physicians. This type of gag rule, however, directly conflicts with the doc-
tor's duty to obtain informed consent; if noncovered treatment options
are available and appropriate, the doctor must either inform patients of
such options or face liability for battery.2' Thus, in order to shield them-
selves from liability to the patient, doctors must violate such provisions.
Because of the conflicted position in which such gag clauses place doc-
tors, most states have enacted legislation prohibiting these provisions.2 A
recent federal act also prohibits MCOs that care for Medicare patients
from using this type of gag clause in provider contracts. 23
receive; and (iii) options for referral to specialists who are not part of the MCO); see also
D'Isidori, supra note 8, at 194 (discussing financial incentives and outside referrals); Picinic,
supra note 9, at 583-84 (discussing the restrictions placed by gag clauses on the free flow of doc-
tor-patient information).
19. See Picinic, supra note 9, at 581.
20. See id. at 581 & n.69, 582 & n.70.
21. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (stating that a physician
may be duty-bound to "advise the patient of the need for or desirability of any alternative
treatment promising greater benefit than that being pursued").
22. See Robert Pear, States Take Lead in Health Legislation, N.Y. TIMES Sept. 14, 1998, at
A12 (reporting that forty-six states have outlawed gag provisions); see, e.g., 1997 ARK. ACTS
1196 (mandating that no participating provider may be prohibited, restricted, or penalized in
any way from disclosing to any covered person any health care information that such provider
deems appropriate regarding the nature of treatment, risks or alternatives thereto, the avail-
ability of alternate therapies, consultations, or tests, the decision of utilization reviewers or
similar persons to authorize or deny services, the process that is used to authorize or deny
health care services or benefits, or information on financial incentives and structures used by
the insurer); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE 2056.1 (West 1998); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 10-16-121
(West 1998); 1997 CONN. LEGIS. SERV. 97- 99 § 12(a) (West); MNN. STAT. ANN. § 62J.71 (West
1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2s-9(c) (West 1998); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 20A.14(i)(1) (West
1998); see also Bethany J. Spielman, After the Gag Episode: Physician Communication in Man-
aged Care Organizations, 22 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 437,451 & nn.44-45 (1998).
23. See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4704(a), 111 Stat. 251, 496
(1997).
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2. Doctors' Compensation Structure
A second kind of gag clause restricts a doctor's ability to disclose de-
tails about how she is compensated by the MCO or about the physician
incentive structure the MCO uses to contain coStS.24 MCOs have claimed
that these clauses are necessary to protect proprietary information re-
garding the details of how the business is run. MCOs, the argument goes,
labored intensively to negotiate the details of their contracts with partici-
pating providers, and competitors could use such information to gain a
competitive advantage if they were obliged to disclose it.2
Requiring doctors to withhold such information from patients, how-
ever, can again be seen to conflict with physicians' duty to inform their
patients of all information relevant to giving informed consent for treat-
ment. From a doctor's perspective, information on how an MCO com-
pensates physicians is most useful for the patient when he is deciding
which MCO plan to join, assuming he has a choice of plans. To be sure, a
doctor may be reluctant to supply such information herself if she is con-
cerned that such knowledge may jeopardize the trust the patient places in
her to provide the best care possible. Nevertheless, many doctors prefer
to have the right to disclose such information because they believe it may
give their patients information relevant to making an informed decision
about which MCO is appropriate for them.
The use of such incentives may well be a necessary cost-containment
tool, but it can interfere with the doctor-patient relationship. As a result,
those states that have legislated in this area have tended to place on
MCOs the burden of providing information regarding compensation
structures.26
3. Public Criticism
The third category of gag rules, which includes anti-disparagement
clauses, prohibits health care providers from criticizing the policies of the
MCO to the general public or to patients' 7 Such a gag provision con-
tained in U.S. Healthcare's provider contracts states:
Physicians shall agree not to take an action or make any communication
which undermines or could undermine the confidence of enrollees, potential
enrollees, their employers, their unions, or the public in [the MCO] or the
quality of [the MCO's] coverage .... Physicians shall keep the Proprietary
24. See Picinic, supra note 9, at 582-83.
25. See id. at 608.
26. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1076(A)(6) (West 1998); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 24-A, § 4302(c) (West 1998); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 62J.72 (West 1998).
27. See Picinic, supra note 9, at 581-82.
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Information [payment rates, utilization review procedures, etc.] and this
Agreement strictly confidential.2
Other gag provisions more explicitly discourage doctors from advising
patients to seek plans that may better suit their particular medical needs.
Consider, for example, the requirement that "[p]hysicians shall not, di-
rectly or indirectly, counsel or advise any Enrollee to disenroll from any
Contracting Payor program or product or to access such program or
product through any person or entity other than the IPA.
29
If the doctors have legitimate complaints about a plan, many MCOs
require that they be expressed to the MCO rather than to individual pa-
tients." Some physicians, however, argue that such clauses hinder their
ability to fulfill the responsibility of informing patients about the quality
of care their MCOs provide.31 Only a few states have protected physi-
cians' rights to criticize MCO policies to their patients.
B. Implied Gag Clauses
The vast majority of states have acted to prohibit certain types of gag
clauses, especially those that explicitly interfere with the doctor's duty to
inform patients of all available treatment options. Nonetheless, implied
gag rules, created by typical MCO incentive systems, can have as insidi-
ous an effect on the doctor-patient relationship. Implied gag rules are
unwritten codes of conduct that MCOs enforce against their affiliated
providers. Many provider-MCO affiliation contracts have at-will or no-
cause termination clauses. MCOs can use such clauses to enforce implied
gag rules by implicitly suggesting that providers who appeal denials of
care or criticize the MCO's policies too often-that is, providers who im-
pose too many costs on the MCO by undertaking such actions-will be
terminated. Currently, providers who are terminated under such provi-
sions have virtually no recourse, because almost no regulation of at-will
termination clauses exists in this context. Implied gag rules and their ef-
fect on doctors will be discussed further in Part II.
28. Kwon, supra note 10, at 844 (citing Families USA, HMO Consumers at Risk: States to
the Rescue (visited Jan. 17, 1997) <http://epn.org/families/farisk.html>).
29. D'Isidori, supra note 8, at 196 (quoting American Medical Association, Background
Information About "Gag" Clauses 2 (unpublished information provided by the AMA))
(emphasis added).
30. See id.
31. See Spielman, supra note 22, at 455.
32. See id. at 456; see also, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2056.1 (West 1998); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-16-121 (West 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62J.71 (West 1998).
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II. EFFECrS OF MCO GAG PROVISIONS ON PHYSICIANS
This Part will discuss the effects of MCO gag provisions on physi-
cians. While much has been written about the deleterious effects of the
provisions on patients enrolled in MCO plans,3 3 comparatively little has
been written about the effects on doctors who must face the competing
directives of professionalism, tort liability avoidance, and employment
necessity.' This Part will argue that, because a large number of doctors
must rely on MCO affiliation for their livelihood and because a large
number of them are employees-at-will of the MCOs, doctors must often
choose between the Scylla of losing their MCO affiliation and their live-
lihood for failing to abide by the gag provisions and the Charybdis of
being held liable for malpractice for failing to inform their patients ade-
quately.
As a practical matter, most doctors in the United States must be af-
filiated with an MCO in order to make a living.3s But most doctors have
employment-at-will arrangements with MCOs. 6 Employees-at-will may
be dismissed from employment at any time, for any reason or for no rea-
son at all.3 ' As a result, MCOs are generally allowed to release doctors on
a minimal showing of cause and are entitled to terminate their contracts
with doctors if the doctor provided care in a manner inconsistent with the
MCO's policies. Physicians who disclose treatment options about which
the MCO, for financial reasons, does not wish its members to know face
dismissal and a serious threat to their livelihood. Furthermore, even if a
physician is not explicitly bound by a written gag clause, because she is an
33. See, e.g., Mark 0. Hiepler & Brian C. Dunn, Irreconcilable Differences: Why The Doc-
tor-Patient Relationship Is Disintegrating at the Hands of Health Maintenance Organizations and
Wall Street, 25 PEPP. L. REv. 597 (1998); Kwon, supra note 10, at 829; Picinic, supra note 9, at
583-85 (1997); Diane S. Swanson, Comment, Physician Gag Clauses-The Hypocrisy of the
Hippocratic Oath, 21 S. ILL. U. L.J. 313 (1997).
34. See D'Isidori, supra note 8, at 203-06 (noting that gag provisions create conflicts of in-
terest for physicians); Julia A. Martin & Lisa K. Bjerknes, The Legal and Ethical Implications of
Gag Clauses in Physician Contracts, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 433, 458-61, 467-68 (1996) (discussing
infringement of physicians' free speech rights imposed by gag provisions and consequences for
violating ethical principles at the behest of MCOs).
35. See John P. Little, Note, Managed Care Contracts of Adhesion: Terminating the Doctor-
Patient Relationship and Endangering Patient Health, 49 RUTGERS L. REv. 1397, 1427-29
(1997).
36. See Alan Somers, What You and Your Physician Client Need To Know About Managed
Care Contracts (Part 1), PRAc. LAW., Mar. 1996, at 15, 26-27; Peter B. Jurgeleit, Note, Physi-
cian Employment Under Managed Care: Toward a Retaliatory Discharge Cause of Action for
HMO-Affiliated Physicians, 73 IND. L.J. 255, 256 (1997) (noting that "[p]hysicians typically con-
tract with HMOs on an at-will basis").
37. See Payne v. Western & At. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884) (applying the employ-
ment-at-will rule and holding that, under the rule, employees could legally be dismissed "for
good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong").
38. See Jurgeleit, supra note 36, at 256.
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employee-at-will, she may be dismissed for taking any action that the
MCO deems subversive.
A. Contractual Remedies
Since gag provisions provide that physicians may not disclose certain
information to their patients, contracts between MCOs and physicians
that contain such provisions fall into the category of so-called "contracts
of silence., 39 Neither the courts nor academics have adequately examined
the legal status of "contracts of silence., 40 It is unclear whether gag
clauses can be stricken by judges absent a statute, even though the
clauses appear to be contrary to the public interest.41
Blackmail involves contracts of silence, and it is illegal in every U.S.
jurisdiction. One compelling reason for its illegality is that a significant
class of those adversely affected by blackmail are nonparties to the trans-
action.43 For example, if one individual exacts payments from another in-
dividual on pain of publicizing the fact of an otherwise unsolved murder,
both the murderer and the blackmailer arguably benefit from the transac-
tion, whereas the victim's family and the general public, nonparties to the
transaction, suffer significant harm from it. Along similar lines, Alan Gar-
field argues that courts should regulate contracts of silence because they
"threaten public access to information."" Garfield's analysis, therefore,
provides a patient-protection rationale for regulating gag provisions:
Even if both parties to an agreement containing a gag clause were made
better off by it, patients served by the MCO-affiliated doctors would be
unacceptably harmed by it.
A compelling rationale from the physician's perspective also exists.
One could plausibly argue, for example, that a contract that potentially
forces a physician to abandon her professional responsibilities could be
stricken by a court because it is unconscionable. Courts void contracts for
unconscionability when they result from a process marked by unequal
bargaining power and when they contain substantively unfair terms.
45
With respect to the former condition, it has been convincingly argued
that physicians, having limited ability to negotiate, are effectively re-
39. Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 261, 264 (1998).
40. See id. at 263 & nn.3-4.
41. Cf D'Isidori, supra note 8, at 211-13 (discussing the inadequacy of the common law
public policy exception to employment-at-will in protecting MCO-affiliated physicians).
42. See, e.g., James Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
670 (1984).
43. See id. at 702-05.
44. Garfield, supra note 39, at 266.
45. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445,449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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quired to accept the terms of employment provided in MCO form con-
tracts.46 With respect to the latter condition, any provision that may re-
quire a physician to withhold information that she believes is relevant to
her patients' ability to give informed consent is tantamount to a contract
to commit malpractice, because physicians owe a duty of informed con-
sent to their patients.47
B. Doctor's Duty of Care to Patients and the Double-Bind
Some authorities have characterized the relationship between a phy-
sician and her patients as analogous to a fiduciary arrangement. 48 Like a
fiduciary, a physician is held to a high standard of care because her pa-
tients rely on her professional expertise in providing treatment advice
and in advocating for their best interest. Doctors thus have a common
law duty to inform their patients of all reasonable options before the pa-
tient is deemed to have granted informed consent for a given treatment
protocol. 49 Without informed consent, a physician may not treat an indi-
vidual; if she does, she can be held liable for battery.0 In addition, the
Hippocratic Oath and American Medical Association standards place an
ethical and professional duty on physicians to provide the best care pos-
sible and to advocate on behalf of their patients."
In practice, however, a doctor-patient relationship differs from a typi-
cal fiduciary relationship, especially when the doctor is an MCO affiliate.
For example, fiduciaries may not create conflicts of interest or promote
their own self-interest.52 MCO-affiliated physicians, in contrast, are
placed in a double-bind, forced to decide between taking into account the
patient's best interests and considering their own employment and finan-
cial incentives. Gag rules, whether express or implied, heighten the doc-
tor's dilemma.
46. See Little, supra note 35, at 1427-29.
47. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
48. See Maxwell J. Mehhnan, The Patient-Physician Relationship in an Era of Scarce Re-
sources: Is there a Duty To Treat?, 25 CONN. L. REV. 349, 367 (1993) (citing case law indicating
that the doctor-patient relationship is a fiduciary arrangement).
49. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787-88 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (holding that a patient
must be informed of potential hazards of treatment, treatment alternatives, and likely results of
refusing treatment before being deemed to have granted informed consent).
50. See id.
51. Doctors who take the Hippocratic Oath swear to follow the plan of treatment which
they consider most beneficial to their patients. HIPPOCRATES, HIPPOCRATIC OATH (W.H.
Jones trans., 1923), reprinted in MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY AND MORALS:
PHYSICIANS' CONFLICr OF INTEREST 268 (1993). This ancient standard of care has survived in
contemporary statements of medical ethics. See AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,
PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS Principle 11 (1980), quoted in RODWIN, supra, at 269.
52. See Marc A. Rodwin, Strains in the Fiduciary Metaphor: Divided Physician Loyalties
and Obligations in a Changing Health Care System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 241,244 (1995).
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1. Implied Gag Rules
As noted above, termination clauses in provider-MCO contracts often
allow physicians to be terminated for no cause at all or on a minimal
showing of cause based solely on economic factors. Such factors may in-
clude poor profit margins due to overutilization of health care resources
by one doctor compared to the level of resource utilization by other phy-
sicians affiliated with the MCO. Such economic credentialing frequently
fails to take into account the medical necessity of the increased resource
utilization in individual cases. 3 Thus, affiliated providers are forced to
consider their own standing within the MCO when making decisions con-
cerning patient care. Physicians know that, if they do not cooperate ex-
tensively with their MCOs, they may be dismissed and thereby lose a
substantial portion of their livelihood.
Even if she has the ability to obtain prior authorization for resource
utilization, a physician may be reluctant continuously to seek authoriza-
tion for expensive treatments for fear that the MCO might terminate her
for economic reasons. Similarly, a doctor may be reluctant to challenge
or appeal an MCO's decision to deny coverage for a specific treatment
for fear of appearing uncooperative with the MCO. Thus, many doctors
may opt not to order substantially useful treatment, at all. In addition,
physicians may be disinclined to inform patients of treatment options not
covered by their MCO if they think the patients might choose a different
MCO in order to obtain such coverage. For the same reason, doctors
avoid openly criticizing the MCO's coverage policies and disclosing a sys-
tem of physician incentives that discourages overutilization. If an MCO
observed that a participating physician was losing enrollees or that a high
number of that physician's enrollees challenged the MCO's denials of
coverage, it could dismiss that provider, having only to show the de-
creased profitability of the provider's affiliation or no cause at all. 4
When doctors have challenged their dismissal by an MCO, courts
have generally upheld no-cause termination provisions as well as provi-
sions that permit termination exclusively on economic grounds.5 For ex-
ample, in Knapp v. Palos Community Hospital,56 the court upheld the de-
fendant hospital's decision to terminate the privileges of several
physicians because they overutilized the hospital's resources. The Knapp
53. See Kwon, supra note 10, at 852-54.
54. See Little, supra note 35, at 1447 ("In reaching a medical decision, a physician must now
consider not only the potential medical risks of a given treatment, but also the willingness of the
MCO to provide the treatment, the potential for confrontation should the MCO deny treatment
and the economic ramifications of being terminated.").
55. See Kwon, supra note 10, at 854.
56. 465 N.E.2d 554 (111. App. Ct. 1984).
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court held that the hospital's termination decisions were "not subject to
judicial review," as long as the hospital followed its own bylaws in mak-
ing the decision to terminate the physicians, because the hospital was far
better equipped than the court to make economic decisions for its busi-
57ness.
A recent New Hampshire case provided some hope for physicians
seeking to challenge termination under a no-cause agreement!" The New
Hampshire Supreme Court read a common law implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing into an at-will termination clause. The court held
that a dismissed physician has a cause of action against an MCO if there
is evidence that the at-will termination was the result of "malice or bad
faith in retaliation for action taken or refused by the employee."59 The
court noted that public policy grounds for review of the termination
could be invoked, because "the termination of [Harper's] relationship
with Healthsource affects more than just his own interest.' However,
the court upheld the right of MCOs to use at-will provisions.6' Thus, the
only precedent the case set in favor of physicians was a right to challenge
a termination decision if the plaintiff believes the action was taken in bad
faith or as a retaliatory measure. Such a high standard is often difficult to
meet, especially if the MCO can point to economic factors that courts are
reluctant to review.62
New York has been one of the few states to enact legislation offering
substantial protection to physicians terminated by an MCO.63 Under the
New York law, MCOs must provide a written statement of reasons for a
termination decision and must grant hearings at which the doctor may
protest the decision. Furthermore, MCOs must provide the economic
data that led to the decision to terminate and must give the terminated
physician an opportunity to explain her higher rate of utilization. The
physician may defend her record by proving, for example, that her pa-
tients had more ailments than average. This law also prohibits bad faith
or retaliatory terminations. Thus, New York no longer permits its MCOs
to terminate physicians without cause and now requires them to provide
an economic justification for the termination decision in the context of
the physician's clinical profile.6
57. Id. at 563.
58. See Harper v. Healthsource N.H., Inc., 674 A.2d 962 (N.H. 1996).
59. Id. at 965.
60. Id. at 966.
61. See id.
62. See Knapp, 465 N.E.2d at 563.





2. Legislative Remedies Currently Available to Physicians
As indicated above, in Subsection I.A.1, many states have acted to
prohibit the most egregious examples of express gag provisions in order
to allow doctors to perform their common law and ethical duty to obtain
informed consent from their patients. However, at-will termination
clauses still pose a significant threat to physicians. Such clauses permit
the enforcement of implied gag rules, thus interfering with a physician's
ability to act in her patient's best interest. Federal attempts to enact uni-
form legislation to protect doctors' advocacy for their patients have failed
thus far.6" In addition, a number of courts have interpreted ERISA 66 to
preempt much state legislation that would otherwise regulate MCO-
provider contracts. 6' Thus, MCOs can continue to threaten physicians
with termination, employing de facto gag clauses with virtual impunity.
A number of courts have interpreted ERISA to preempt state law
claims brought by terminated physicians for breach of contract. For ex-
ample, in Zuniga v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan,6 the court held
that ERISA preempted the breach-of-contract claim of a doctor whose
affiliation to the defendant was terminated for alleged overutilization.69
The court, applying the Supreme Court's interpretation of ERISA pre-
emption established in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,70 held that the federal act
preempts any state law that relates to a company-funded employee bene-
fits plan.71 Although a number of commentators have argued that Con-
gress never intended to regulate MCO-provider contracts through
ERISA, the Supreme Court has yet to resolve the issue.2
III. EFFECTS OF MCO GAG PROVISIONS ON PATIENTS
To the extent that gag provisions restrict complete disclosure to pa-
tients, the patient-physician relationship is impaired. First, the patient
cannot give informed consent. Second, patients will not be aware of the
content and extent of information withheld by the physician and, thus,
will tend not to seek second opinions to acquire information they should
have.73 "[I]nformation... is precisely what is being bought from most
65. See infra Section IV.B.
66. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
67. See, e.g., Zuniga v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 52 F.3d 1395 (6th Cir. 1995).
68. Id.
69. See id. at 1402.
70. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
71. See Zuniga, 52 F.3d at 1402.
72. See, e.g., Little, supra note 35, at 1464-65. Other courts have upheld a cause of action by
terminated physicians, holding that ERISA does not preempt such actions. See, e.g., Napoletano
v. CIGNA Healthcare of Conn., 680 A.2d 127, 130 (Conn. 1996).
73. See David R. Ohuos & Shari Roan, HMO 'Gag Clauses' on Doctors Spur Protest, L.A.
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physicians .... 74 In fact, a major concern in the business of managed
care is that "health care consumers will not be able to formulate the pref-
erences for which they wish to negotiate."75 Ultimately, the gag provi-
sions undermine the firmly rooted contractual and fiduciary foundations
of the patient-physician relationship.
The patient is, like the doctor, caught in a no-win situation. Most pa-
tients have little or no choice in their selection of a health plan, which is
largely determined by their employers. Even if the physician offers a pa-
tient the opportunity to obtain treatment elsewhere, the patient may lack
the financial means to do so, as the particular treatment may fall outside
the range of employer-provided health care benefits. Furthermore, even
for patients with financial means, alternative coverage is often denied,
since the patient is already sick and unprofitable to other MCOs. While
the resolutions to some of these problems require analysis beyond the
scope of this Article, it is clear that the search for resolutions must begin
with a critical examination of the nature and extent of the effects of gag
provisions on patients.
A. Breach of Physician's Duty
The doctor's duty to her patient has at least three bases. First, the re-
lationship between the doctor and patient has been recognized as a con-
tract, which, express or implied, establishes the physician's duty to aid the
patient who is, in essence, a person in peril.76
Second, tort principles require that a physician be held liable for
medical malpractice if she "fails to provide the care to a patient that a
reasonable physician under the same circumstances would provide, even
if the physician is prevented from providing reasonable care by limited
resources."'7 Physicians are also subject to tort liability for denying care
solely (or largely) in order to increase their income."
TIMEs, Apr. 14,1996, at Al.
74. Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM.
ECON. Rnv. 941, 946 (1963); see also Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and the Economics of Personal
Health Care Information, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1, 48 (1997) ("A gag rule affects a medical service,
namely information about treatment options, that plays a special role in health care." (emphasis
added)).
75. Schwartz, supra note 74, at 48.
76. See, e.g., Lyons v. Grether, 239 S.E.2d 103, 105 (Va. 1977) (stating that the doctor-
patient relationship "springs from a consensual transaction, a contract, express or implied, gen-
eral or special").
77. D'Isidori, supra note 8, at 200; see also Wickline v. California, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661, 670-71
(Ct. App. 1986) (stating that a physician who complies without protest to limitations imposed by
a third-party payor cannot avoid ultimate responsibility for patient's care if the care provided is
unreasonable); Mehlman, supra note 48, at 352 (discussing the extent to which physicians are
required to furnish access to health care regardless of resource constraints); Jonathan J.
Frankel, Note, Medical Malpractice Law and Health Care Cost Containment: Lessons for Re-
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Third, most courts recognize the fiduciary law foundations of the pa-
tient-doctor relationship.9 Such fiduciary relationships involve the duty
voluntarily undertaken by the physician, that of acting primarily for the
patient's benefit.8° The presumption that the physician possesses superior
knowledge of medical diagnoses and services and that the patient ac-
cordingly places trust in the physician underlies the characterization of a
doctor as a fiduciary.
B. Failure To Secure Patient's Informed Consent
Closely aligned with the patient's claim of breach of duty is the claim
that the physician has violated the patient's right to informed consent. 1
In a medical context, the doctrine of informed consent rests on the notion
of a patient's right to individual autonomy and self-determination-that
is, the right to exercise control over his own body and to determine
whether or not to follow a particular course of medical therapy. Origi-
nating from the common law battery action,82 the doctrine of informed
consent has expanded considerably in scope and has evolved into a negli-
gence-based standard.3 This doctrine may be characterized today as,
perhaps, the patient's most formidable "guardian of individualism": 
4
formers from the Clash of Cultures, 103 YALE L.J. 1297, 1302 (1994) (discussing the impact of
cost containment on physicians' assessment of treatment options and ensuing malpractice
claims).
78. See Mehhman, supra note 48, at 371. But see Madsen v. Park Nicollet Med. Ctr., 419
N.W.2d 511, 515 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that it was proper to exclude evidence that
could have adversely affected her doctor's profits because the "evidence was only marginally
relevant [to the malpractice claim] and potentially very prejudicial"), rev'd en banc on other
grounds, 431 N.W.2d 855 (Minn.).
79. See, e.g., Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 237 F. Supp. 96, 102 (N.D. Ohio 1965)
("It is axiomatic that the patient-physician relationship is a fiduciary one."); Mull v. String, 448
So. 2d 952, 953 (Ala. 1984) (noting Alabama's recognition of causes of action for a physician's
breach of fiduciary duty); Petrillo v. Syntex Lab., 499 N.E.2d 952, 961 (III. App. Ct. 1986)
(stating that society has an established and beneficial interest in the fiduciary quality of the pa-
tient-physician relationship); Woolley v. Henderson, 418 A.2d 1123, 1128 n.3 (Me. 1980) ("The
historical underpinnings of the doctrine of informed consent are frequently attributed to the
fiduciary quality of the physician-patient relationship"); see also Mehlman, supra note 48, at
367-78 (discussing the fiduciary nature of the physician-patient relationship); Rodwin, supra
note 52, at 243 & n.16 (same).
80. A fiduciary is a "person having a duty, created by his undertaking, to act primarily for
another's benefit in matters connected with such undertaking." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 625
(6th ed. 1990).
81. See Picinic, supra note 9, at 591 ("Informed consent originates from the theory that a
health care provider cannot physically contact or treat a patient until the provider has given the
patient an adequate amount of information regarding the proposed treatment with which the
patient may then make an intelligent decision regarding that treatment." (emphasis added)).
82. See id. at 592; see also Pratt v. Davis, 79 N.E. 562, 565 (Ill. 1906) (finding trespass to the
patient where the doctor removed her ovaries without consent); Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12,
16 (Minn. 1905) (holding that a physician's unauthorized treatment of a patient was "at least a
technical assault and battery"); D'Isidori, supra note 8, at 206-07 (discussing the origins of the
doctrine of informed consent).
83. See generally Alan Meisel & Lisa D. Kabnick, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment:
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[I]t protects the patient's right to determine his own destiny in medical mat-
ters; ... it guards against overreaching on the part of the physician; it protects
his physical and psychic integrity and thus his privacy; and it compensates
him both for affronts to his dignity and for the untoward consequences of
medical care.85
Judge Cardozo, in Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital,86 ar-
ticulated this view of patient self-determination, which ultimately rests on
the disclosure and trust present in a fiduciary relationship."' At the core
of informed consent is disclosure-disclosure of the proposed treatment's
risks and benefits, the probability of success, and alternative forms of
treatment.88 The court in Cobbs v. Grant' held that physicians are under
a duty to disclose available medical treatment options and the dangers
associated with each. In fact, a physician has a duty to disclose informa-
tion about a type of treatment even if it is not readily available."'
The informed consent rule is no less applicable in the managed care
arena. The American Medical Association (AMA) guidelines state:
Physicians... should continue to promote full disclosure to patients enrolled
in managed care organizations. The physician's obligation to disclose treat-
ment alternatives... is not altered by any limitations in the coverage pro-
vided by the patient's managed care plan. Full disclosure includes informing
patients of all their treatment options, even those that may not be covered
under the terms of the managed care plan.
91
An Analysis of Recent Legislation, 41 U. Prrr. L. REV. 407, 477-559 (1980) (discussing different
states' approaches to the doctrine of informed consent).
84. D'Isidori, supra note 8, at 206.
85. Alan Meisel, The "Exceptions" to the Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a Balance
Between Competing Values in Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 413,414-15.
86. 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) ("Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a
right to determine what shall be done with his own body...."); see also Picinic, supra note 9, at
591-96 (discussing the doctrine of informed consent and patients' rights).
87. See Picinic, supra note 9, at 593-95 & nn.123-28. Picinic notes that:
Informed consent requires physicians to disclose many things such as: the nature and
consequences of the procedure or treatment; the diagnosis; the risk of the procedure;
the alternatives to the proposed treatment; the prognosis if there is no treatment; the
prognosis with treatment; and the disclosure of success rates and outcomes for a par-
ticular procedure. In addition, physicians may be required to notify a patient of any
existing conflict of interest.
Id. at 593-95 (footnotes omitted).
88. To obtain informed consent, a physician must "explain the proposed procedure to a pa-
tient and warn [the patient] of any material risks inherent in the treatment so that the patient
can make an intelligent decision to undergo the procedure." D'Isidori, supra note 8, at 207. For
judicial articulation of the informed consent rule, see, for example, Nishi v. Harti'ell, 473 P.2d
116, 119 (Haw. 1970) (requiring physicians to inform patients of risks, benefits, outcomes, and
alternatives for treatments).
89. 8 Cal. 3d 229,243 (1972).
90. See Halle Fine Terrion, Note, Informed Choice: Physicians' Duty To Disclose Nonread-
ily Available Alternatives, 43 CASE W. Rus. L. REv. 491, 509-10 (1991) (examining duty of phy-
sicians to disclose nonreadily available alternatives to patients under fiduciary and informed
consent doctrines arising from the contractual relationship).
91. Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association, Ethical Issues
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Additionally, the AMA places upon MCOs the burden of "adher[ing]
to informed consent" by giving patients "full disclosure of material in-
formation... [including] inform[ing] potential subscribers of limitations
or restrictions on the benefits package when they are considering enter-
ing the plan." Upon enrollment, and at least annually thereafter, the
AMA also requires MCOs to disclose "any incentives to limit care" of-
fered to physicians employed or reimbursed by the managed care plans.93
Despite issuing these guidelines, the AMA has failed to articulate a
framework that would allow courts to effectively and consistently deter-
mine whether the physician's (and MCO's) duty to inform the patient has
been breached. Courts typically use a two-step analysis when inquiring
into violations of a patient's right to informed consent. The first question
is whether the patient would have consented to the treatment had the
physician adequately disclosed the material risks, benefits, and alterna-
tives;94 and the second question is whether nondisclosure was the proxi-
mate cause of the patient's injury.9 This creates two potentially trouble-
some issues for litigants and patients' rights advocates. First, whether a
particular gag provision in a physician's contract forced her to violate the
duty of informed consent must be determined on a case-by-case basis.
Second, and complicating the first issue, the plaintiff faces the burden of
proof to establish that he would not have made particular treatment
choices had there been full disclosure.
C. Holding Managed Care Organizations Liable
The debate on gag provisions turns on the relationship of the patient
with his physician and with the managed-care organization. MCOs have
minimal duties to solicit the informed consent of patients because the
physician-not the MCO-intrudes upon the patient's right to self-
determination.96 Nonetheless, MCOs can be held liable for the acts of
employed physicians (including failure to obtain informed consent from
patients) through the doctrines of ostensible agency97 and respondeat su-
in Managed Care Guideline 2(f) (1994), quoted in D'Isidori, supra note 8, at 208 n.99.
92. Id. at Guideline 2(e), quoted in D'Isidori, supra note 8, at 209 n.102.
93. Id. at Guideline 3, quoted in D'Isidori, supra note 8, at 208 n.101.
94. See Terrion, supra note 90, at 500-01. The first step in the analysis may be resolved by
applying one of three possible standards for disclosure: the medical professional standard, the
reasonable patient standard, or the subjective standard. For further insight into this analysis, see
id. at 502-06.
95. See id. at 500.
96. See Nancy M. King, Consent to Treatment, in HEALTH CARE FACILITIES LAW:
CRITICAL ISSUES FOR HOSPITALS, HMOS AND EXTENDED CARE FACILITIES § 7.4, at 482.
97. See, e.g., Boyd v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229, 1235 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988)
(finding a material issue of fact as to the MCO's liability for the negligence of its physicians un-
der the theory of agency because the MCO's advertisements indicated that there was an agency
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perior.9 A strong argument can be made that MCOs should be liable un-
der either agency or respondeat superior theories when physicians abide
by gag clauses that prohibit the disclosure of relevant information to pa-
tients. Additionally, MCOs may be liable under the theory of corporate
negligence,99 ERISA,'O breach of contract,'' breach of warranty,'O° and
bad faith.' 3 The latter claims may be difficult, however, for the patient to
argue in court.
First, since these claims rely on establishing direct corporate liability
for a physician's action or failure to act, the patient must prove the physi-
cian liable on malpractice grounds. This will be difficult for the patient to
establish, since the "reasonable physician" standard used to assess mal-
practice claims is much more difficult to meet than the standard in in-
formed consent cases.'O' To succeed in a malpractice claim, the patient
"must prove that the physician's negligent performance resulted in in-
jury."' ' However, even if such injury exists, courts will probably not at-
relationship between the doctor and the MCO); Picinic, supra note 9, at 598 & n.141.
98. For respondeat superior to apply, an employer-employee relationship must exist be-
tween the physician and the MCO. If the MCO exerts sufficient control over the physician-
employee, the MCO may be found liable for the physician's acts. See Picinic, supra note 9, at
598 & n.142; see also Sloan v. Metropolitan Health Council, 516 N.E.2d 1104, 1109 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1987) ("[A] corporation may be held vicariously liable for malpractice for the acts of its
employee-physicians."); Dunn v. Praiss, 606 A.2d 862, 868-69 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1992)
(finding an MCO liable under the theory of respondeat superior for the negligent acts of its
physicians where the doctor was determined to be an actual agent of the MCO due to the level
of control that the MCO exercised over the physician). But see Raglin v. HMO Illinois, Inc., 595
N.E.2d 153, 158 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (holding that an MCO was not liable under the theory of
respondeat superior for negligent acts of its physicians when the physicians were considered
independent contractors). Accordingly, to determine whether an MCO is liable for the acts of
its providers, the relationship between the MCO and the physicians must be carefully evaluated.
99. Under the theory of corporate negligence, an MCO has the duty to exercise care in se-
lecting, supervising, and controlling its medical staff. This duty extends to ensuring that patients
receive high quality care. Accordingly, a patient may sue an MCO for "negligent interference
with the patient's health care decisions" by employing gag clauses or utilization reviews. Picinic,
supra note 9, at 598 n.145.
100. See supra note 5.
101. A patient may allege that the MCO breached its contract by failing to provide high
quality medical services as promised in the enrollment contract. In order to recover, the patient
must prove that the harm "arose in the usual course of events from the breach or that the harm
could 'reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time
they made the contract."' Linda V. Tiano, The Legal Implications of HMO Cost Containment
Measures, 14 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 79, 90 (1990) (citing Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep.
145, 151 (Ex. 1854)).
102. For instance, MCOs may be held liable for failing to conform to published statements
in their subscriber contracts or promotional brochures.
103. A patient may argue that the MCO, in bad faith, enforced "restrictions on various
medical procedures, medical treatment, and hospital stays as well as limitations on referrals to
specialists and outside physicians." Picinic, supra note 9, at 600 & n.147 (quoting Diana Joseph
Bearden & Bryan J. Maedgen, Emerging Theories of Liability in the Managed Health Care In-
dustry, 47 BAYLOR L. REv. 285, 334-37 (1995)).




tribute it to the existence of gag provisions. A physician's failure to dis-
close conflicts of interest will not result in malpractice liability because
"the basis of malpractice liability is the deviation from the standard of
care, not the presence of a hidden economic incentive."'0
6
Second, an MCO will rarely be found liable on contract or breach of
warranty principles for employing gag provisions. To prevail, the patient
must prove that the MCO made specific promises of a particular level of
care to its enrollees and that such level of care was not met. This con-
struction may allow the rare patient to establish MCO liability if the
MCO "clearly promise[d] a particular result"'O' and if the patient
"consented to an operation or other procedure in reliance""' on such
promise. In general, however, most patients will not prevail, largely be-
cause courts have found that an MCO's literature claiming that it will
provide "high standards" of medical care represents only "generalized
promises of a good result,"'O' not a guarantee. Thus, courts have effec-
tively precluded liability for breach of warranty.
Accordingly, an MCO's liability for imposing gag clauses is severely
limited.
IV. PROPOSALS
Both doctors and patients suffer under a regime of gag clauses and
have limited recourse to change it. Because such provisions are wide-
spread throughout the managed care industry, and thus the health care
industry as a whole,"' doctors cannot easily avoid express or implied gag
clauses.1 2 Inside a restrictive work environment, doctors face termination
106. Id. at 457 (emphasis added).
107. Depenbrok v. Kaiser Found. Health Plans, 144 Cal. Rptr. 724,726 & n.2 (Cal. Ct. App.
1978).
108. Id.
109. Pulvers v. Kaiser Found. Health Plans, 160 Cal. Rptr. 392,393 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
110. Before the general outlawing of express gag clauses, such rules were a common com-
ponent of MCO contracts. Indeed, gag clauses became a badge of shame only recently, when
the number of MCO consumers dramatically increased. For instance, the provider contracts of
Kaiser-Permanente, one of the country's largest MCO providers, had overt gag clauses until
1995. Today, implied gag clauses are still widespread, and at-will employment contracts are the
norm.
111. Eighty-six percent of workers and their families are covered by managed care insur-
ance plans. See Joseph P. Shapiro, There When You Need It, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 5,
1998, at 66.
112. The fact that most doctors work for multiple providers creates only the semblance of
discretion because it also fosters similarities between care providers. As a result, "most of to-
day's MCOs are not the differentiated delivery systems visualized in competition theory[;
ilnstead, they are merely financing intermediaries all offering virtually the same product and
differing from the third-party payers of the old paradigm only in their ability to demand lower
prices.., from providers." Clark C. Havighurst, Making Health Plans Accountable for the
Quality of Care, 31 GA. L. REV. 587, 630 (1997).
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for tacitly or explicitly violating gag clauses. Notably, physicians may also
fear for their job security even outside of the workplace. Under at-will
termination, public critique or participation in an organized movement.
to reform the industry could cost a doctor her job.
Patients are, first, unable to exercise true informed consumer discre-
tion when choosing plans and, later, limited in their ability to induce ac-
tion through suit. Because MCOs function under a broad shield of liabil-
ity protection established by ERISA, many of their customers are not
entitled to sue them under state remedies. Moreover, with little man-
dated disclosure, MCOs are free to establish rules that keep valuable cus-
tomer information away from the customer, on the grounds that such in-
formation is proprietary.
A. The State Legislation Solution
1. New York's Statute
In 1996, New York enacted a fairly comprehensive statute that effec-
tively prevents MCOs from using implied gag rules to hold the threat of
termination over a doctor's head.14 The legislation imposes minimum
standard appeal procedures for physicians' challenges to contract termi-
nations. 5 In addition, the statute prohibits terminations as retribution
"solely" because the doctor appealed a denial of care, advocated on be-
half of her patients, or filed a complaint against the insurer."' The appeal
process must also give a doctor the opportunity to present evidence that
her patients required a greater level of resource utilization than those
treated by other similarly situated physicians under the plan."7
The statute has certain gaps, however. First, the insurer appoints all
three members of the appeals board that reviews a doctor's termination
decision."' Such unilateral appointment authority could compromise the
113. Of course, MCOs have an interest in creating a positive public image, so they may
sponsor certain reform movements. See, e.g., Bob Diddlebock, Ethics Code Aims at HMOs,
DENVER POST, Oct. 7, 1998 (reporting that a consortium of healthcare providers and medical-
community figures in Colorado established the "Colorado Code of Ethics for Healthcare," a set
of principles aimed at promoting a community standard of ethics in managed care delivery)
(visited Oct. 17, 1998) <http://www.denverpost.com/business/bizl007b.htm>.
114. See N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 4801-4908 (McKinney 1998).
115. See id. § 4803.
116. See id. § 4803(e).
117. See id. § 4803(d) ("[E]ach health care professional shall- be given the opportunity to
discuss the unique nature of the health care professional's patient population which may have a
bearing on the professional's [economic evaluation] profile and to work cooperatively with the
insurer to improve performance.").
118. See id. § 4803(b)(3).
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impartiality of the appeals board." 9 In addition, while the physician can
provide evidence indicating a need for greater than average utilization,
there is no provision indicating how heavily the appeals board must
weigh such evidence in reviewing a decision to terminate. Moreover,
while the statute mandates that termination may not be based "solely" on
retributive reasons, the weak language still allows an MCO to use such
reasons in a termination decision, provided it can articulate additional
reasons for the decision. For example, an affiliated doctor might be ter-
minated properly under the statute if the MCO were to cite increased
costs imposed by the physician on the insurer due in part to the physi-
cian's filing of appeals of utilization denials. Finally, the statute explicitly
provides that its provisions are not applicable to review procedures under
a plan governed by ERISA, that is, self-funded benefit 
plans.12 '
2. ERISA Preemption
State efforts to ban physician gag clauses may fail to protect most
managed care consumers. More than eighty-six million Americans re-
ceive their health care coverage through private employer-sponsored
plans.1 = Most courts have held that many state-law causes of action are
preempted by the broad reach of ERISA.Y3
ERISA's provisions "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as
they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.' 24 The
statute defines state law as "all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other
State action having the effect of law, of any State."'1' Most courts con-
strue ERISA's preemptive power broadly-state law is preempted if it
has a "connection with or reference to" an employee benefit plan.2 6 The
"relates to" language has the effect of allowing ERISA preemption for
state tort actions based on an MCO's negligence in denying necessary
119. See Little, supra note 35, at 1462-63.
120. See id. § 4803(d).
121. See id. § 4908; infra Subsection V.A.2.
122. This figure represents more than half of all privately insured Americans. See Martin &
Bjerknes, supra note 34, at 463 (discussing the ERISA limitations on MCO liability for impos-
ing gag clauses on physicians).
123. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994); see Bryan A. Liang, Patient Injury Incentives in Law, 17
YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 1, 11-21 (1998).
124. Id. § 1144(a).
125. Id. § 1144(c)(1).
126. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983) (ruling that a state law "relates to" a
benefit plan if the law has a "connection with or reference to" a benefit plan); see also Pilot Life
Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1987) (construing the term "related to" to give a
"broad common-sense meaning" to the statute); Eleanor D. Kinney, Procedural Protections for
Patients in Capitated Health Plans, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 301, 310-314 (1996) (discussing ERISA
regulation of employer-sponsored health plans).
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medical care. 27 Accordingly, ERISA preempts the majority of claims
against MCOs, specifically those based on denial of coverage, misrepre-
sentation as to plan benefits, financial incentives, disclosure require-
ments, and utilization review decisions.H The courts have designated
these elements as administrative decisions and, thus, have invoked
ERISA preemption.
129
A number of state-law-based claims are not subject to ERISA pre-
emption. First, ERISA does not preempt state regulation of the insur-
ance business.13' Second, ERISA does not preempt state common law
claims based on straightforward grounds of medical malpractice.13 ' The
majority of claims challenging gag clauses, however, are not based on
malpractice but rather seek to establish patient rights to particular medi-
cal coverage or treatment options. 32 As a result, ERISA will preempt a
majority of claims made by managed care patients-specifically the
eighty-six million subscribers enrolled in ERISA plans-because "an
HMO is likely to argue that the claim involves an administrative aspect of
the plan in order to trigger ERISA 's preemption effect."' 3
The Supreme Court's refusal to resolve the issue of whether ERISA
preempts state-law-based tort claims against MCOs T' and the uncertain
scope of its ruling in New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue
127. See, e.g., Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937,943 (6th Cir. 1995) (dismissing
a claim for wrongful death where an MCO denied psychiatric benefits and the patient subse-
quently committed suicide); Spain v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 11 F.3d 129, 132 (9th Cir. 1993) (ruling
that ERISA preempts a suit in which an MCO refused to authorize and later delayed approval
for a bone marrow transplant); Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan, 999 F.2d 298, 302 (8th Cir.
1993) (holding that ERISA preempts a wrongful death suit in which the MCO initially refused
and then delayed approval for heart surgery). Several cases, however, hold that state tort claims
are not preempted. See, e.g., Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637, 646 (7th Cir. 1995); Pacificare, Inc. v.
Burrage, 59 F.3d 151, 155 (10th Cir. 1995), Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, 57 F.3d 350, 351-52 (3d
Cir. 1995); see also Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 363, 365, 374 (7th Cir. 1998); supra text ac-
companying notes 1-6. For additional insight on judicial construction of ERISA preemptions of
claims related to managed care, see Little, supra note 35, at 1464-68 and Susan 0. Sheutzow, A
Framework for Analysis of ERISA Preemption in Suits Against Health Plans and a Call for Re-
form, 11 J.L. & HEALTH 195 (1996-97).
128. See Picinic, supra note 9, at 614 & nn. 214-15.
129. See, e.g., Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding
that even though the MCO made the medical decision, it was still considered an administrative
decision regarding benefits made under the plan and, thus, was preempted by ERISA).
130. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
131. See, e.g., Pickett v. Cigna Healthplan, 742 F. Supp. 946 (S.D. Tex. 1990) (concluding
that state, not federal, law should apply in a malpractice action because the MCO was not acting
as an ERISA plan manager).
132. See Little, supra note 35, at 1464-68.
133. Picinic, supra note 9, at 615 (emphasis added).
134. See Cigna Healthplan v. Louisiana, 82 F.3d 642 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 117 S. Ct. 387
(1996); Little, supra note 35, at 1467; Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Roundup: Justices Ref-




Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.13' complicate the matter. Here,
Travelers Insurance Company and the Health Insurance Association of
America attempted to invalidate a New York statute that required hospi-
tals to collect insurance surcharges from MCOs.1 6 The Supreme Court
held that the New York statute did not "relate to" employee benefit
plans within the meaning of ERISA's preemption clause, and further,
that ERISA does not preempt state laws that have only an indirect effect
on the relative cost of health insurance.'37 The legal feasibility of a plain-
tiff allegation that a state law or state tort claim has only an indirect eco-
nomic effect-as well as the relative success of such claims-is uncertain.
Because the ERISA preemption has a broad scope and an uncertain fu-
ture, the feasibility of filing anti-gag-clause claims under state law may be
limited. The logical remedy is to secure federal legislation designed to
protect all managed care patients.
B. The Federal Solution
Part I of this Article described how doctors and patients face a variety
of problems when attempting to deliver and receive proper care in man-
aged care systems today. No single solution can adequately address these
difficulties; they demand a series of affirmative acts by MCOs and con-
sumer discretion. But how can such reforms be achieved? Because
MCOs are unlikely to self-regulate, 3s government intervention in the
form of federal and state regulations is necessary. Federal regulation is
preferable, because state regulation leads to fragmented policies regard-
ing standards of care,"9 and because ERISA and pending federal legisla-
135. 514 U.S. 645 (1995). Note that the uncertainty of the scope of the Court's ruling results
largely from the difficulty of drawing a bright-line rule distinguishing the regulation of state in-
surance from ERISA regulation.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 661-62.
138. Historically, MCOs have sought to minimize the kinds of legislative reform for which
this Article calls. See, e.g., supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. This left open the option of
self-regulation. Recently, however, MCOs have not lived up to past promises of this sort. See,
e.g., Bruce Bryant-Friedland, HMO Report Card: Incomplete, JACKSONVILLE TIMES-UNION,
Oct. 16, 1998, at Al (reporting that MCO industry promises to report performance to the Na-
tional Committee for Quality Assurance dwindled in 1998, with 447 plans reporting perform-
ance information to the Committee, but 155 prohibiting the public disclosure of this informa-
tion, up from 41 plans that refused public disclosure in 1997). In spite of such past performance,
the threat of intrusive government regulation has motivated some MCOs to call for voluntary
(rather than legislative) policies that foster greater informed decision-making by patients. See,
e.g., Diddlebock, supra note 113.
139. According to the Health Policy Tracking Service of the National Conference of State
Legislatures, over 1,000 bills relating to some aspect of managed care were introduced in legis-
latures throughout the country in 1997, and nearly as many in 1996. In 1997, 200 of those bills
were passed and signed into law. See Milt Freedman, Pioneering State for Managed Care Con-
siders Change, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1997, at Al; Who's Regulating Managed Care? People's
Medical Society Newsletter 3:17, June 1998, at 5. These numbers suggest the variety of reforms
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tion may preempt state regulations.140 An analysis of federal proposals
dealing with gag clauses and of associated regulations is needed.
141
A number of federal bills have recently been introduced to confront
the continuing problem of express and implied gag clauses in MCO-
provider contracts. However, the managed care industry has strongly re-
sisted to any proposals that its members believe might threaten their cost
containment strategies. In addition, partisan squabbling has prevented
the enactment of bills currently before Congress. Furthermore, none of
the current bills effectively addresses the issues at the core of the debate:
(1) the market failure due to the lack of information available to con-
sumers prior to enrollment in an MCO; and (2) the inability of patients to
make informed health care decisions after enrollment.
contemplated and enacted by states.
Because states differ in the rigor of their regulation of managed care, it is difficult to provide
a straightforward analysis of which states currently provide the best consumer protections. Gen-
erally speaking, states with little regulation, such as South Dakota, offer few consumer protec-
tions, and states with extensive regulation, such as New York, best protect consumers. See, e.g.,
FAMILIES USA FOUNDATION, Hrr AND MISS, STATE MANAGED CARE LAWS 20-21 (July 1998);
supra Subsection IV.A.1. In New York, state laws ensure that MCOs disclose treatment options
to patients, that consumers have access to specialists as primary care providers, and that pa-
tients are granted standing referrals to specialists. FAMILIES USA FOUNDATION, supra, at 200.
140. See infra Section IV.B and accompanying text. MCOs should not, per se, fear federal
legislation. While such legislation may expose them to tremendous liability, the crafting of these
bills is an opportunity for the organizations to work with legislators to create a viable, truly
competitive atmosphere for the future of managed care. In fact, some MCOs have recognized
advantages of federal regulation. In 1997 Kaiser-Permanente, Group Health Cooperative of
Puget Sound, and HIP Health Plans-three major not-for-profit health plans-joined forces
with the American Association of Retired Persons and Families USA to promote federal regu-
lations that would require health plans to follow 18 principles. Among these principles are:
5. Disclosure of information to consumers, including "procedures for utilization man-
agement" and "a description of the methodologies used to compensate physicians[;]"
14. No limits on provider communication with patients.
15. Written standards for provider credentialing, barring discrimination against doc-
tors who "treat a disproportionate number of patients with expensive or chronic medi-
cal conditions[;]"
16. No payment incentives that overtly encourage withholding necessary care;
Would Federal Oversight in These 18 Areas Be a Cure Worse Than the Disease?, MANAGED
CARE (Oct. 1997) <www.managedcaremag.com/archiveMC9710/9710.legislator.shtml>. Each
of these principles addresses a concern presented in this Article and provides a point of depar-
ture for addressing these concerns as they will be discussed in the analysis of the pending fed-
eral reform bills.
141. Several organizations and interest groups have analyzed the general differences be-
tween the two pieces of current proposed federal legislation (H.R. 4250, 105th Cong. (1998),
and H.R. 3605, 105th Cong. (1998)), though usually in a partisan fashion. See Basic Consumer
Protections: How the Federal Bills Compare (visited Oct. 20, 1998)
<hppt://www.familiesusa.org/managedcare+u/COMPARE2.HTM>; Laura Beers, Mismanaged
Care: Patients' Bill of Rights Debate Misses the Point, PRINCETON PROGRESSIVE REv., Oct. 6,
1998 <http://www.princeton.edul-progrev/98-99/nl b.html>; Amy Goldstein & Helen Dewar,
Senate Kills "Patient" Rights Bill, WASH. POST, Saturday, Oct. 10, 1998, at A01; Summary of
House Republican Leadership Plan (visited Oct. 16, 1998)
<http://www.house.gov/commercedemocratslpbor/summ2.htm>.
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1. Patient Right To Know Act
The first bill, introduced by Rep. Greg Ganske (D-Iowa), a physician
himself, and Rep. Edward Markey (D-Mass.) in February 1996, was enti-
tled the Patient Right to Know Act of 1996. It would have prohibited
health plan and provider contracts that "restrict or interfere with any
medical communication," a term defined broadly in the bill.42 The bill
also would have prohibited a health plan from taking action against any
doctor, such as termination of a contract, refusal to contract, or refusal to
refer patients, in retaliation for the physician's refusal to abide by a gag
clause."' It would have imposed civil damages for violations 44 and pre-
empted less restrictive state legislation.14' The bill, however, never cleared
the Ways and Means Committee.
2. Patient Communications Protection Act of 1996
In the same year, Sen. Ron Wyden (D-Or.) introduced a bill that
would have prohibited health plans from restricting communications be-
tween physicians and patients and imposed a fine for violations.146 The
bill did not provide for civil penalties for violations based on oral, rather
than written, communications "unless the communication is part of an
[established] pattern [that is] demonstrated by a preponderance of the
evidence.' ' 47 Thus, this proposal did not prohibit implied gag rules en-
forced by at-will termination clauses. The bill failed after federalism con-
cerns were raised, claiming that state laws already substantially regulated
gag clauses.14 ' The record does not indicate, however, any concern about
whether ERISA might preempt much of that state legislation.
49
3. Revived Patient Right To Know Act
Representative Ganske revived the Patient Right to Know Act in
February 1997 in similar form,50 and Sen. Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.) introduced
142. See H.R. 2976, 104th Cong. (1996). "Medical communication" is defined to include
"any tests, consultations and treatment options," id. § 2(b)(2)(A), "any risks or benefits associ-
ated with such tests, consultations and options," id. § 2(b)(2)(B), and any "financial incentives
or disincentives offered by [a health plan] entity to a health care provider that are based on
service utilization," id. § 2(b)(2)(F).
143. See id. § 2(a)(2).
144. See id. § 2(c).
145. See id. § 2(e).
146. See S. 2005,104th Cong. (1996).
147. See id. § 2(c)(i).
148. See 142 CONG. REc. S. 10,245 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1996) (statement of Sen. Coats).
149. See id.
150. See H.R. 586, 105th Cong. (1997).
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it in the Senate a month later.15' The bills would have nullified contractual
provisions between MCOs and doctors that constrained oral communica-
tions between providers and their patients.ls However, MCOs would still
have been able to enforce implied gag clauses through threats of termina-
tion under no-cause provisions or by decreasing particular physician re-
ferrals. Nonetheless, the bills explicitly covered ERISA-regulated plans53
and defined "medical communication" broadly, requiring the disclosure
of all financial incentives that could affect patient care.4 Neither bill,
however, made it to a floor vote.
4. Patient Access to Responsible Care Act
Representative Charlie Norwood (R-Okla.) introduced another bill in
1997, the Patient Access to Responsible Care Act (PARCA)' which at-
tempted to balance protection of patients and doctors with the need for
health plans to contain costs. The bill would have permitted MCOs to
maintain utilization management measures, while requiring physicians to
oversee utilization review.'56 PARCA would have prohibited restrictions
on communications between providers and patients"7 and mandated a
timely review procedure to appeal denials of care.56 Significantly, the bill
also sought to amend ERISA in order to permit wrongful death and per-
sonal injury suits against MCOs covered by ERISA.9 After the health
care industry applied pressure, stating that permitting suits against MCOs
would raise costs dramatically, Rep. Norwood offered a substitute for
PARCA that eliminated the proposed broadening of legal exposure.6
Representative Norwood's bill also would have prohibited termina-
tion of provider contracts without cause and required MCOs to provide
due process protections and to consider the medical necessity of in-
creased utilization in determining whether to dismiss a provider."' While
many Democrats endorsed this bill, as well as a similar proposal based on
the American Medical Association's "Patients' Bill of Rights," the House
Republican leadership refused to endorse it, relying upon estimates that
the bill, if enacted, would force an increase in premiums by as much as
151. See S. 449, 105th Cong. (1997).
152. See id. § 2(a)(1); H.R. 586 § 2(a)(1).
153. See S. 449 § 3(3); H.R. 586 § 3(B)(3).
154. See S. 449 § 3(4)(A)(iii); H.R. 586 § 4(4)(A)(iii).
155. H.R. 1415, 105th Cong. (1997).
156. See id. § 2(a)(2).
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See id. § 4(a).
160. See Responsibility in Managed Care Act of 1997, H.R. 2960,105th Cong. (1997).
161. See H.R. 1415 § 2(a)(2).
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23% on average and might cause an estimated 4.6 million individuals to
lose their insurance. 62 Nonetheless, 90 Republicans endorsed the bill af-
ter it was introduced.163
5. Patients' Bill of Rights Act
The Patients' Bill of Rights Act of 1998 (PBRA),'64 which included
provisions similar to those in PARCA, was endorsed both by President
Clinton and leading congressional Democrats. PBRA included a provi-
sion prohibiting "inappropriate financial incentives" as they had been de-
fined under the Health Care Financing Administration Medicare regula-
tions.' 65 In addition, PBRA would have protected doctors from
retribution by the MCO for advocating for their patients in the appeals
process. 66 Finally, it would have amended ERISA to permit states to set
up remedies for patients who were wrongfully denied or delayed in their
receipt of treatment. While PBRA did not directly define "trade secrets"
in the context of MCO information, it did include two requirements:
MCOs must create firm written policies on all significant aspects of care
authorization,' 67 and they must disclose extensive information on the
scope of coverage, alternatives to coverage, and possible out-of-pocket
expenses to consumers.168
New estimates supplied by the Congressional Budget Office sug-
gested that the Democrats' proposal, if enacted in its entirety, would only
have increased individual premiums by an average of two dollars per
month. 9 Nonetheless, PBRA failed to pass the House.
70
162. See Alieta Eck, Is There a Cure?, STAR-LEDGER (Newark), Oct. 18, 1998, at 1.
163. See Jonathan Cohn, Mangling Care, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 10, 1998, at 16.
164. H.R. 3605, 105th Cong. (1998); S. 1890,105th Cong. (1998).
165. See id. § 151(b)(4). The United States Department of Health and Human Services
previously enacted a federal initiative that prohibited MCOs that serve Medicare patients from
stifling doctor-patient discourse regarding care. In December 1996 for Medicare patients and in
February 1997 for Medicaid patients, the agency restricted, according to its director of the office
of managed care, Bruce Merlin Fried, "'any contractual provisions, including ... gag rules, that
restrict a health care provider's ability to advise patients about medically necessary treatment
options....' Robert Pear, Clinton Prohibits H.M.O. Limit on Advice to Medicaid Patients,
N.Y. TmES, Feb. 21, 1997, at A22.
166. See H.R. 3605 § 144(a).
167. See id. § 115(b). The bill also would have mandated disclosure of these policies to the
government but would have required individual access to information on utilization reviews
"only to the extent it is necessary to perform the utilization review activity involved." Id. §
115(c)(5).
168. See id. § 121(b)-(c).
169. See 144 CONG. REc. H5742 (daily ed. July 17, 1998) (statement of Rep. Pallone).
170. The bill failed by five votes on the same day that the competing Republican bill passed
by a narrow margin.
Yale Law & Policy Review
6. The Patient Protection Act
In response to PBRA, the Republican leadership introduced a
weaker bill, the Patient Protection Act of 1998.171 The bill passed the
House on July 24, 1998, by a vote of 216 to 210,72 but has not yet been
submitted for a vote in the Senate.17 ' This bill lacked the provisions pro-
tecting physicians from retribution for advocating on the behalf of their
patients. It also failed to include substantial regulation of financial incen-
tives and did not amend ERISA, thereby perpetuating the limited nature
of remedies available to patients injured by their MCO's misconduct.74
C. Analysis of the Current Proposed Legislation
Although legislators have submitted numerous proposals, Congress
has not enacted any of them. It is highly unlikely that any legislation will
pass until well into the next Congress, because none of the bills has re-
ceived broad bipartisan acceptance.
While unfortunate, this provides time for reflection on the content of
the proposed bills and allows for dialogue about which aspects, if any, the
pending legislation lacks. For purposes of our discussion, it allows for an
assessment of whether protections effectively barring implied gag clauses
have been proposed.
The most promising of all pending bills is PBRA. As noted, this bill
would prohibit inappropriate physician financial incentives,1 75 shield phy-
sician advocacy on behalf of patients' medical care,176 and uphold state
law remedies for wrongfully denied or inappropriately delayed care.7
The Patient Protection Act, on the other hand, does not properly ad-
dress the concerns voiced in this Article. The most significant disadvan-
tage of the bill is that, although it would forbid outright prohibitions on
doctor-patient communications, it would not address other restrictions of
these communications. Not only would the plan fail to establish a clear
171. H.R. 4250, 105th Cong. (1998).
172. Mary Jane Fisher, Compromise Patients' Rights Bill Introduced, NAT'L UNDERWVRITER
- PROP. & CASUALTY, Aug. 3,1998, at 6.
173. Because of intense partisan disagreement, the legislation never made it to the floor of
the Senate for debate. See Robert Pear, Senators Reject Bill to Regulate Care by H.M.O.'s, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 10, 1998, at Al.
174. Under this plan, remedies are limited to the value of the benefit. Under certain cir-
cumstances, civil monetary penalties are available, but these are capped at $100,000. See H.R.
4250 § 1197 (a)(3). For general information on the limits of the plan see Cohn, supra note 163,
at 16.
175. H.R. 3605, 105th Cong. § 142(b) (1998).
176. See id. § 144(b).
177. See id. § 302.
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ban on implied gag clauses, it would fail to address improper financial in-
centives and obstacles to patient-advocacy.
While both plans provide for the release of specific information to
subscribers, PBRA is more demanding, requiring the collection of infor-
mation related to quality of care. This requirement includes the collec-
tion of data on aggregate utilization, patient satisfaction, voluntary with-
drawal, and grievances.7' The sum of this information is needed for truly
informed decision-making.
D. Suggested Modifications to PBRA
While comprehensive, PBRA does not address the central issue of
the entire gag clause debate: the free flow of information to consumers.
Only under a system of broadly disclosed information will MCO sub-
scribers be able to navigate the free market of managed care. Although
PBRA would outlaw physician incentives and give consumers access to
information about the extent of their care, PBRA would allow the with-
holding of a sum of information invaluable to informed decision-making.
1. Strengthen the Prohibition on Physician Incentives That May
Impair Patient Care
Requiring the disclosure of physician payment plans to consumers
will ensure that physician incentives to restrict patient care are truly
eliminated. While PBRA does prohibit physician incentive plans, it does
so in an ambiguous fashion that may leave room for explicit and implicit
exceptions. One alternative to the present statute would make its lan-
guage more robust, expressly prohibiting both implicit and explicit incen-
tive plans.179 Alternatively, payment schemes could be made public.'8
This would discourage MCOs from establishing indirect or covert incen-
tive structures and would restore patient confidence in MCO physician
advice."'
178. See id. § 112.
179. Rhode Island provides a model template for such language and is an exception to the
general rule of poorly written state prohibitions against physician incentives. The Rhode Island
law forbids MCO plans "from making 'specific payments directly or indirectly to the provider as
an inducement or incentive to reduce or limit service, to reduce the length of stay or the use of
alternative treatment settings or the use of a particular medication with respect to an individual
patient...."' FAMILIES USA FOUNDATION, HIT AND MISS, STATE MANAGED CARE LAWS 17
(1998) (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17.13-3(B)(8) (1997) (footnote omitted)).
180. This information should be revealed before the consumer subscribes to the plan and
should also be available, by request, in a boilerplate form that a patient can request from a doc-
tor at the time of care. Physician Incentive data should be written in plain language and, in or-
der to be effective, must be accompanied by any supplemental data (such as the cost of given
procedures) necessary for the consumer to make use of the information.
181. While it is assumed doctors would prefer to practice in a regime without such incen-
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2. Publicize Standards for Denial of Coverage
In order to allow a patient to determine whether a doctor or MCO is
acting out of self-interest or in the patient's interest, patients should be
made aware of the standards for denial of coverage and the appeal pro-
cedures within the MCO for challenging a denial of coverage. Although
PBRA establishes necessary protections for doctor advocacy and pro-
tects the patient and doctor from the threat of termination for aggressive
pursuit of care, the patient should be fully informed of the MCO utiliza-
tion procedures. The consumer should be entitled to know the identity of
the decision-maker or decision-making body, the basis for the decision,
the doctor's recommendation, and the details of the grievance process."
Comprehensive disclosure of this information, coupled with PBRA's
requirement that the possible limitations of care be divulged at the time
of subscription, will create a greater sense of justice in the event that care
is denied. The consumer will be aware that care may be refused and will
know under what circumstances this may occur. Moreover, disclosure of
the out-of-pocket costs at the time of subscription may encourage MCOs
to offer a greater number of supplemental coverage options to accom-
modate risk-averse customers.'
3. Establish Standardized Procedures for Dismissing Doctors
MCOs should establish standardized procedures for physicians' ap-
peals of their dismissals that would require an MCO to consider the
medical necessity of increased utilization before terminating contracts
with providers. At-will termination should be eliminated, or at least pro-
hibited when it occurs on the basis of economics without regard to clini-
cal considerations. 184
This recommendation provides greater protection than the proposed
PBRA rules, because PBRA would simply mandate a procedure for no-
tives, the law should strictly discourage physicians' participation in hidden-incentive plans. The
simplest way to do this would be to hold doctors liable when they accept incentives for patient
care.
182. PBRA does establish subscriber access to information surrounding grievance proce-
dures. See H.R. 3605 § 121(b)(8). This would expedite the process of the grievance by making it
less mysterious. It would not help the patient, however, if his petition were denied. A better rule
would require disclosure of such details when the patient is in a position to choose between
plans so that consumers could comparison shop for the aspects of plans that best suited their
expectations and desires.
183. For an in-depth development of economic informed consent, see generally Mark A.
Hall, A Theory of Economic Informed Consent, 31 GA. L. REv. 511,630 (1997).
184. Unlike most employment situations, doctors and care providers are necessarily eco-
nomic adversaries. Excluding savings attributable to preventative medicine, the better a doctor
does her job, the more she costs her employer.
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tice and review of decisions regarding employment.' 5 Without standard-
ized procedures for dismissal, the associated protections of the bill, such
as those surrounding vigorous patient advocacy by physicians, would
have little effect. Under the threat of at-will termination, doctors can
never be free of the express, implied, or simply feared threats of provid-
ing optimal health care.
V. CONCLUSION
Gag clauses are a simple method of cost containment. By eliminating
recommendations for care or providing other incentives to discourage
comprehensive medical treatment, MCOs perform a vital function both
for their own survival and for that of affordable healthcare in America.
What we propose is not reverting to a pre-managed-care system where
insurers funded treatment without appropriate controls. Rather, we en-
dorse a structure of free flowing information that would allow for better
patient decisions about coverage and treatment. Managed care subscrib-
ers could choose at the outset the type and extent of care for which they
desire coverage, knowing in advance its potential limits.
With appropriate institutional safeguards, the proposed system would
increase the efficiency of care. Patients would receive open assessment of
treatment options, knowing physician incentives were prohibited. Pro-
tecting patient advocacy and publicizing physician-compensation schemes
would ensure the integrity of physician recommendations. Patients would
also know the limits of their insurance and have access to fair and open
grievance procedures. Such a system would lend itself to increased vari-
ety in coverage options and would more effectively incorporate individ-
ual risk assessment into managed care.
The foregoing amendments to the pending federal legislation would
help establish this system. These important improvements seek to liber-
ate doctors from unreasonably restrictive care-giving and patients from
the burdens of uninformed decision-making. Only when these proposals
or other similar reforms are effected will doctors and patients benefit
from physicians' ability to live up to the solemn oath upon which their
profession is founded:
I will follow that system of regimen which, according to my ability and judg-
ment, I consider for the benefit of my patients, and abstain from whatever is
185. H.R. 3605 § 143(a).
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deleterious and mischievous.... Into whatever houses I enter, I will go into
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